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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890185-CA 
v. : 
E. O'DELL STANLEY : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions of operating a pyramid 
scheme, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989) and practicing medicine without a license, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-12-30 
(Cumm. Supp. 1989) in the Fourth Judicial District Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel? 
2. Whether the trial court had proper subject matter 
jurisdiction to try defendant under Utah Code Ann. SS 58-12-
28(4)(a) (1986) and S 58-12-30 (Cumm. Supp. 1989)? 
3. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain 
defendant's convictions for operating a pyramid scheme and 
practicing medicine without a license? 
4. Whether defendant's constitutional challenge to 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989) was properly preserved for 
appellate review, and if so, whether Utah Code Ann. S 76-6a-3 
(Supp. 1989) is unconstitutionally void for vagueness? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable statutes and rules for a determination 
of this case are, in pertinent part: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(4)(a) (1986)« 
"Practice of medicine" means: 
(a) to diagnose, treat, correct, advise, 
or prescribe for any human disease, ailment, 
injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other 
condition, physical or mental, real or 
imaginary, or to attempt to do so by any 
means or instrumentality. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 (Cuxmn. Supp. 1989): 
It is unlawful to engage in the practice 
of medicine in this state without first 
obtaining a license. Any person who 
engages in the practice of medicine 
without a license shall be guilty of a 
felony; except the following persons may 
engage in activities included in the 
practice of medicine subject to the 
circumstances and limitations stated: 
• • • • 
(5) any individual administering a 
domestic or family remedy including those 
persons engaged in the sale of vitamins, 
health food or health food supplements, 
herb or other products of nature, except 
drugs or medicines for which an authorized 
prescription is required by law. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6a-2(4) (Supp. 1989)i 
"Pyramid scheme" means any sales device or 
plan under which a person gives consideration 
to another person in exchange for compen-
sation or the right to receive compensation 
which is derived primarily from the 
introduction of other persons into the sales 
device or plan rather than from the sale of 
goods, services, or other property. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989)s 
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(1) A person may not organize, establish, 
promote, or administer any pyramid scheme. 
(2) A criminal conviction under this 
chapter is prima facie evidence of a 
violation of Section 13-11-4, the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
(3) Any violation of this chapter 
constitutes a violation of Section 13-11-4, 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
(4) All civil violations of this chapter 
shall be investigated and prosecuted as 
prescribed by the Utah Consumer Sales 
Practices Act. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-7(a) (Supp. 1989): 
A person acting under color of law may 
intercept a wire, electronic, or oral 
communication if that person is a party to 
the communication or one of the parties to 
the communication has given prior consent to 
the interception. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, E. O'Dell Stanley, was charged by amended 
information with operating a pyramid scheme, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989) and 
practicing medicine without a license, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. SS 58-12-28(4)(a) (1986) and 58-12-30 
(Cumm. Supp. 1989) (R. 52-53). Defendant was convicted after a 
jury trial held on September 6, 1988 (R. 113-14). On November 
18, 1988, Judge Boyd L. Park, Fourth Judicial District, sentenced 
defendant to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not 
to exceed five years on each count concurrently (R. 130). The 
execution of both sentences was suspended and defendant placed on 
probation for eighteen months under specified terms and 
conditions (R. 129-30). 
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Defendant filed premature and successive notices of 
appeal (R. 120, 136, 145)- These appeals were subsequently 
dismissed (Case No. 880586-CA, R. 123-24, dismissed R. 137; Case 
No. 880673-CA, R. 138-40, dismissed R. 152). However, the 
appeals, dismissals and remittiturs caused the trial court to re-
impose defendant's sentence on March 10, 1989 (R. 158-60). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant, who had no medical training nor medical 
expertise (T. 316), organized and obtained a Utah business 
license to operate the Healthy Wealthy and Wise Club [hereinafter 
referred to as HWW] (R. 232, 300-01). HWW filed as a non-profit 
corporation (T. 256-57). Its product, Super Oxol, was registered 
as "cleaning fluids or to help clean the environment" and 
alternatively as "cleaning fluids" (R. 230-301). The 
registration did not indicate the product was intended for 
medical use nor internal consumption (R. 301). 
Super Oxol was produced by defendant by mixing 
distilled water with hydrogen peroxide (R. 230-31). Defendant 
purchased cases of distilled water from Smith's Food King. He 
would empty approximately 12 ounces of the distilled water from 
its gallon container and replace the water with 12 ounces of 
hydrogen peroxide, 38% solution, from in a 55 gallon drum. The 
one gallon distilled water container was then sealed with a new 
lid and a Super Oxol label was placed over the distilled water 
label (R. 230-31). The resulting Super Oxol solution contained 
anywhere from a three to eleven percent solution of hydrogen 
peroxide (R. 214-15). 
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Dr. Joseph Miner, M.D., director of City County Health 
Department, Utah County, testified that when purchased from a 
store, hydrogen peroxide is generally in a solution from three to 
six percent (R. 209). Solutions over eight percent are 
considered corrosive (R. 209, 213). The only medical uses for 
hydrogen peroxide are as a topical antiseptic and an aid for 
cleaning off dead tissues in a wound (R. 209-10). If taken 
internally in concentrated solutions above three to six percent, 
hydrogen peroxide will cause severe irritation, esophagitis 
inflammation, and gastrointestinal bleeding (R. 210, 213). Even 
at lower level solutions, repeated ingestion of hydrogen peroxide 
can cause similar types of internal irritation (R. 213). 
Despite claims that HWW was created as a non-profit 
organization to promote healthy lifestyles based on the 
consumption of Super Oxol, HWW was structured such that its 
income was generated from the sale of its memberships rather than 
its product (R. 232-33). For twenty-five dollars ($25.00) a 
month, an HWW member would receive one gallon of Super Oxol (R. 
234). Any additional purchases of the product could be made at 
wholesale. The members were free to resell the gallons at 
retail. Any profit would be retained by the member but no 
commission for sales could be earned (R. 233-34, 304-06). 
However, the primary financial incentive to membership was the 
commission or bonuses paid to members for every new member 
recruited (R. 232-33). For each new member recruited, a member 
would receive a commission of six dollars and twenty-five cents 
($6.25) (R. 233). The member would also earn a percentage from 
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each subsequent member recruited by the new member (R. 233). 
Thus, if a member at the first level had ten members immediately 
under him and the second level members each had ten members under 
them, the first level member would purportedly earn six thousand 
two hundred fifty dollars ($6,230*00) a month in commissions from 
HWW (R. 242). On the other hand, if a member recruited no new 
members but sold two hundred gallons of Super Oxol a month, the 
member would receive no commission from HWW (R. 306-07). 
Information concerning the commissions or bonuses for 
recruiting new members and potential earning at various levels 
were contained in all HWW membership applications (R. 227). 
Members promised to share the sales plan with friends and 
neighbors (R. 235). Defendant actively promoted the use of Super 
Oxol and HWW membership throughout the county including at senior 
citizen centers (R. 282, 294). 
Richard Castro, chief investigator for the Utah County 
Attorney's Office, listened to defendant's sales pitch in one of 
these meetings. Mr. Castro testified defendant represented that 
as much as one hundred twenty eight thousand, seven hundered 
seventy dollars ($128,770.00) could be earned each month (T. 77). 
This income was based strictly on the introduction of new members 
to HWW and not on the sales of any product (T. 68). 
On March 9, 1988, Rosa Krolls, the mother of a 
secretary in the Utah County Attorney's Office (T. 44), at her 
daughter's request, telephoned defendant to purchase some Super 
Oxol. The delivery was set for the next day at Mrs. Krolls' home 
(T. 45). With Mrs. Krolls' permission, her living room was wired 
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for sound (T. 49). A transcript was subsequently prepared of the 
meeting between Mrs. Krolls and defendant (T. 50). 
On March 10, 1988, defendant met with Mrs. Krolls at 
her home (R. 218). Mrs. Krolls told defendant she had high blood 
pressure. Defendant responded that if she drank Super Oxol ". . 
. it would make [her] a lot healthier and would help [her]" (R. 
221-22). He further explained that Super Oxol would expand and 
clean her blood vessels, giving them more elasticity and making 
it easier for her blood to flow thereby reducing her blood 
pressure (R. 220, 224). Defendant claimed he also warned Mrs. 
Krolls to watch her blood pressure very carefully because it 
might go too low if she was taking blood pressure pills as well 
(R. 297). Mrs. Krolls purchased a gallon of Super Oxol for 
$12.50 (R. 219, 221). 
During their meeting, defendant told Mrs. Krolls about 
HWW, left her a membership application explaining the multi-level 
sales scheme and offered to take her to a meeting (R. 219-20, 
228-29). Defendant told Mrs. Krolls that if she became a member 
of HWW and sponsored four new members and they in turn each 
sponsored down to the fifth level, she would receive four 
thousand two hundred eighty five dollars ($4,285.00) in 
commissions each month. If she sponsored five new members she 
could earn over twelve thousand dollars ($12,000.00) in 
commissions a month (R. 294-95). 
Defendant testified on his own behalf (R. 269-317). He 
did not dispute any of the State's evidence as to the origination 
of HWW and Super Oxol (R. 271-72), the method of operation of HWW 
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(R. 285-87) nor the meeting and representations made to Mrs. 
Krolls (R. 271). 
Instead, defendant took issue with Dr. Miner's 
statements that the internal ingestion of hydrogen peroxide 
cannot expand nor cleanse blood vessels nor provide any other 
medical purpose or benefit (R. 211-12). Defendant claimed, based 
on his review of medical literature, that the daily ingestion of 
hydrogen peroxide in forms such as Super Oxol could produce more 
energy and stamina (R. 282-83) and help "most anything" (R. 273), 
including aids coronary disease, cancer, diptheria and whooping 
cough (R. 283-84, 316-17). Defendant asserted that the American 
Medical Association was against the consumption of hydrogen 
peroxide because its use would "reduce disease by 98 percent" and 
limit the need for doctors (R. 300). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The defendant has failed to establish that his trial 
counsel committed any demonstrable errors which reasonably 
affected the outcome of his case. The Utah Interception of 
Communications Act permits the recording of a conversation 
without prior authorization of the Court where a party to the 
conversation has consented to the taping. Since defendant's 
counsel had no basis on which to object to such a recording, his 
failure to do so cannot be viewed as error nor as prejudicial to 
the defendant. Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel must necessarily fail. 
Defendant was properly charged under both the 
substantive statute prohibiting the practice of medicine without 
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a license and the definitional section specifically describing 
what constitutes the practice of medicine; therefore, the trial 
court had proper subject matter jurisdiction to try defendant. 
The evidence adduced at trial and the reasonable 
inferences supported by that evidence are sufficient to sustain 
defendant's convictions for promoting a pyramid scheme and 
practicing medicine without a license. Consequently, defendant's 
convictions should be affirmed. 
Lastly, defendant's claim that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-
3 (Supp. 1989) prohibiting the operation of a pyramid scheme is 
void for vagueness is not properly preserved for appellate 
review; therefore, this Court may choose not to reach the merits. 
Should the merits of defendant's claim be considered, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6a-3 clearly and unambiguously describes what criminal 
conduct is prohibited. Because an ordinary reader would be 
informed of the conduct prohibited, the statute is not void for 
vagueness. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL. 
It is axiomatic that a defendant is guaranteed the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel. State v. Crestani, 
771 P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061 
(Utah 1989). To substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, a defendant must show Mboth that his or her counsel 
rendered a deficient performance is some demonstrable manner and 
that a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective 
counsel, the result would have been different," State v. 
Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1089, quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
118 (1989), State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988). A 
reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome," ^d. at 1089, citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 
(1984) . 
Defendant's sole allegation in support of his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is that his defense counsel 
failed to object to the recorded conversation between defendant 
and Mrs. Krolls on March 10, 1988. Defendant asserts that the 
recording was in violation of Utah's Interception of 
Communications Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23a-l to -11 (Supp. 
1989), because there was not a court order authorizing the 
recording. 
Defendant correctly asserts that illegal interceptions 
may not be entered into evidence, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-7 
(Supp. 1989). However, defendant has misconstrued the act as 
prohibiting all recordings done without court order, including 
consentual recordings and interceptions (Br. of App. at 6-7). 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-4(7) (a) specifically provides: 
A person acting under color of law may 
intercept a wire, electronic, or oral 
communication, where that person is a party 
to the communication, or one of the parties 
to the communication has given prior consent 
to the interception. 
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(Empha sis added.) 
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have consistently held that there is no violation 
of constitutional rights where electronic surveillance is used 
with the consent of one of the parties. United States v. 
Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 744 (1979); United States v. White, 401 
U.S. 745, 751, 753 (1971) (plurality opinion); reh'q denied, 402 
U.S. 990 (1971); State v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 
1986); and State v. Boone, 581 P.2d 571, 573-74 (Utah 1978) 
(decided under former statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-401(2) 
(1973)). 
Here, the Utah County Attorney's Office wired Mrs. 
Krolls living room with her permission. Additionally, Mrs. 
Krolls was a consenting participant in the recorded conversation. 
The recording was never admitted at trial. Its purpose was 
merely to memorialize the conversation to which Mrs. Krolls 
eventually testified. There was no legitimate ground upon which 
defendant's attorney could have objected to the recorded 
conversation. As a result, defendant cannot support even the 
first prong of his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-4(7)(a) (Supp. 1989) was amended in 
1988 and 1989. While the statute was renumbered and reworded, 
its substance remained the same. The previous version read: 
It shall not be unlawful under this 
chapter for a person acting under color of 
law to intercept a wire or oral 
communication, where that person is a party 
to the communication, or one of the parties 
to the communication has given prior consent 
to the interception. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-4(2)(b) (1982). 
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that his counsel rendered a deficient performance is some 
demonstrable manner. Defendant's claim cannot "overcome the 
strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and 
exercised 'reasonable professional judgment,'" State v. Frame, 
723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 669. Without a showing that counsel's performance was 
deficient, there are no grounds to conclude defendant was 
prejudiced. Defendant's claim that he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel is without merit. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD PROPER SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION TO TRY DEFENDANT. 
Defendant maintains that he was prosecuted only under a 
definitional section of the Utah Medical Practice Act and, 
therefore, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. 
(Br. of App. 9-10.) An examination of the record reveals that 
defendant's claim is in error. 
Defendant correctly states that the information was 
amended at trial (T. 2-4). However, he incorrectly asserts he 
was charged and convicted solely under the definitional section 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(4)(a) (1986), rather than both Utah 
Code Ann. S§ 58-12-28(4)(a) (1986) and 58-12-30 (Cumm. Supp. 
1989) (R. 52).2 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-12-28(4)(a) (1986) was recodified in 1987 
and 1989 such that subsection (4)(a) is now subsection (5)(a). 
The language is the same. Since defendant and the information in 
question refer to subsection (4) (a), respondent will as well. 
See S 58-12-28(5)(a) (Cumm. Supp. 1989). 
The original information charged defendant with 
deceptive business practices in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-507 (Supp. 1989), doing business without a license, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-410 (1978) and practicing 
medicine without a licence in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-
12-30 as defined by § 58-12-28(3) (4) (R. 54) (Copy attached in 
Addendum as Appendix A). The information was subsequently 
amended to charge defendant with operating a pyramid scheme in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-3 and practicing medicine 
without a licence in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 and 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(4)(a) (R. 52-53) (Copy attached in 
Addendum as Appendix B). 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 provides in pertinent part: 
It is unlawful to engage in the practice of 
medicine in this state without first 
obtaining a license. Any person who engages 
in the practice of medicine without a license 
shall be guilty of a felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-28(4)(a) provides: 
"Practice of medicine" means: 
(a) to diagnose, treat, correct, 
advise, or prescribe for any human 
disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, 
deformity, pain or other condition, 
physical or mental, real or imaginary, or 
to attempt to do so by any means or 
instrumentality. 
The amended information did nothing more than state 
with greater specificity the means by which defendant violated 
the criminal statute. It narrowed the scope of relevant proof 
and limited the State's evidence. Indeed, when defense counsel 
objected to the amendment, the trial court ruled the prosecution 
would be limited in proving what acts constituted the practice of 
medicine to the subsection 4(a) definition (R. 176-77). 
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Clearly, the amendment of the information did nothing 
to diminish the subject matter jurisdiction of the district 
court. Utah Const, art. VIII, S 5; Utah Code Ann. S 78-3-4 
(Supp. 1989). Defendant was properly convicted of a substantive 
offense coupled with a definitional statute. 
POINT III 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED AT TRIAL TO 
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR OPERATING 
A PYRAMID SCHEME AND PRACTICING MEDICINE 
WITHOUT A LICENSE. 
Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence 
to sustain his convictions for operating a pyramid scheme, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989) and practicing medicine without 
a license, Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30 (Cumm. Supp. 1989). 
Defendant specifically argues with respect to his conviction for 
practicing medicine without a license 1) that but for an 
illegally recorded conversation improperly admitted into evidence 
there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction and 2) 
that the evidence is insufficient to show his conduct exceeded an 
exception in Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-30(5) (Cumm. Supp. 1989), 
allowing for domestic or family remedies. With respect to his 
conviction for operating a pyramid scheme, defendant argues that 
there was no evidence of illegal conduct. 
The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a jury trial is well settled. This Court: 
must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict and will interfere 
only when the evidence is so lacking and 
insubstantial that a reasonable person could 
not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989), quoting 
State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983). Further since a 
jury "is in the best position to give proper weight to the 
peripheral nature of [any] contradictory testimony", State v. 
Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 1988): 
It is not this court's duty to measure 
conflicting evidence or the credibility of 
witnesses. That responsibility belongs 
strictly to the trier of fact. M'It is the 
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the 
evidence and determine the credibility of the 
witnesses.' So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, 
from which findings of all requisite elements 
of the crime can reasonably be made, [the 
court's] inquiry stops." 
Id. at 27, quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) 
(citations omitted). A reversal of the jury verdict is only 
warranted when: 
the evidence . . . is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime. 
State v. Harmon, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989), quoting 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). When the defense 
testimony presented merely differs from that of the prosecution 
and the prosecution's account of the facts does not appear to be 
so lacking and insubstantial that the jury must necessarily have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime charged, a reviewing court is obligated to assume the jury 
believed the evidence which supports the jury's verdict. State 
v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 543 (Utah 1981); State v. Smathers, 602 
P.2d 708, 709 (Utah 1979). 
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A review of the record reveals that there is more than 
sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's convictions. 
A. Operating a Pyramid Scheme 
Defendant was charged with operating a pyramid scheme 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989) which in 
pertinent part reads, "A person may not organize, establish, 
promote, or administer any pyramid scheme." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6a-2(4) (Supp. 1989) defines pyramid scheme as 
any sales device or plan under which a person 
gives consideration to another person in 
exchange for compensation or the right to 
receive compensation which is derived 
primarily from the introduction of other 
persons into the sales device or plan rather 
than from the sale of goods, services, or 
other property. 
The jury was properly instructed as to the relevant statutory 
definitions of "consideration", "compensation", "person", and 
"pyramid scheme" (R. 91). 
The evidence established that defendant organized and 
sought a business license to operate the Health Wealthy and Wise 
Club (HWW) (R. 232, 300-01). HWW generated income exclusively 
from the sale of memberships (R. 232-33). Membership dues were 
$25.00 each month which entitled each member to one gallon of 
Super Oxol (R. 234). HWW membership applications contained 
information describing the $25 per month dues, pay scales and 
commission or bonuses that could be earned by recruiting new 
members (R. 227). Commissions were earned solely by inducing new 
members to join. No commission could be earned by selling Super 
Oxol, HWW's only product (R. 232-34, 304-06). Members made 
promises to share the sales plan with friends and neighbors (R. 
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235). Commissions were due to be paid by the 15th of each month 
(R. 235). Expert testimony was presented that based on these 
undisputed facts HWW was structured as a pyramid organization 
marketing plan (R. 242-43). 
The evidence places defendant's conduct squarely within 
the prohibited activities proscribed by statute. Defendant's 
argument that there is was no evidence of illegal conduct is 
simply unfounded. 
B. Practicing Medicine Without a License 
Count II of the information charged defendant with 
practicing medicine without a license in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. SS 58-12-28(4)(a) (1986) and 58-12-30 (Cumm. Supp. 1989). 
The jury was properly instructed that in order to find defendant 
guilty it must find that defendant engaged in the practice of 
medicine without first obtaining a license (R. 88). Practice of 
medicine was defined, in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 58-12-
28(4)(a) as meaning "to diagnose, treat, correct, advise, or 
prescribe for any human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, 
deformity, pain or other condition, physical or mental, real or 
imaginary, or to attempt to do so by any means or 
instrumentality." (R. 89, Jury Instruction 4). 
The evidence was uncontradicted that defendant had no 
medical training nor medical expertise (R. 316). His defense was 
that he had not held himself out as a medical expert and his 
activities did not constitute the practice of medicine (R. 271, 
315). However, the evidence established that defendant, in 
response to an inquiry from Mrs. Krolls about any effect of Super 
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Oxol on high blood pressure, responded that it would expand and 
clean her blood vessels, give them more elasticity, and make it 
easier for blood to flow thereby reducing her blood pressure (R. 
220, 224). He told Mr. Krolls that if she drank Super Oxol that 
she would be "a lot healthier" (R. 221-2). He made general 
representations that the ingestion of Super Oxol would help most 
everything (R. 273). His own testimony was that based on his 
review of medical literature, he believed Super Oxol could reduce 
all disease by 98 percent including aids, coronary disease and 
cancer (R. 283-87, 316-17). 
Clearly defendant had "treated, advised or prescribed" 
his product, Super Oxol, for Mrs. Krolls' reported high blood 
pressure. 
Defendant's contention that but for the illegally 
recorded conversation between himself and Mrs. Krolls's there 
exists insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction is 
frivolous. As discussed previously, (See Point I) the 
conversation was legally recorded pursuant to statutory law. 
Mrs. Krolls was a proper witness to testify to her conversation 
with defendant. Defendant did not dispute the conversation nor 
Mrs. Krolls testimony (R. 271). Further, the tape was never 
admitted into evidence. 
Defendant's other contention that his conduct did not 
exceed the exception proscribed in Utah Code Ann. S 58-12-30(5) 
for domestic or family remedies is also without foundation. The 
jury was instructed on defendant's theory (R. 90) but properly 
concluded that defendant's activities did not constitute a family 
remedy or the sale of vitamins, health food, health food 
supplements, herbs or other products of nature. Commenting on 
the exception for domestic or family remedies, the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Yee Foo Lun, 45 Utah 531, 147 P. 488, 492 
(1915), observed: 
the obvious purpose of the statute is to 
prevent practicing medicine without a license 
. . . . [A]ny one who shall diagnose, treat 
or advise for any physical ailment or 
condition of another, for a fee, compensation 
or consideration is practicing medicine. If 
any one does that without a license he 
offends, no matter the remedy substance, or 
thing he may prescribe, give administer, or 
advise. 
In accord, State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1987). 
Defendant did not simply offer gratuitous and innocuous advice to 
Mrs. Krolls. Rather, he purported to have created a mixture that 
contained "probably the best kept secret in the world" to wit, 
oxygen (R. 280-81). He claimed, based on his medical readings, 
that the internal ingestion of his produce would cure "most 
anything" (R. 273, 283-84). He encouraged Mrs. Krolls to 
purchase Super Oxol as a cure or treatment of her high blood 
pressure (R. 223-24, 273). As such, his conduct clearly comes 
within the parameters of the statute, a statute designed to 
protect: 
. . . [T]he people from the quacks who would 
deceive them into thinking they are receiving 
medical relief when, in reality, they are 
being deprived of their money without the 
remotest possibility of a cure. This type of 
quackery also prevents people who may be or 
are in dire need of competent aid by either 
delaying or foregoing proper treatment. 
These ill people think they are being cured, 
when, in fact, they are receiving no real 
help. 
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State v. Hoffman, 558 P.2d 602, 605-06 (Utah 1976). 
Based on the totality of the evidence, there is more 
than "some evidence" from which the jury could reasonably 
conclude that defendant had both operated a pyramid scheme and 
practiced medicine without a license. The evidence against 
defendant is compelling. With the added presumption in favor of 
the jury's findings, the evidence is more than sufficient for 
this Court to affirm defendant's convictions. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-6A-3 (SUPP. 1989) WAS NOT 
OBJECTED TO AT TRIAL AND CANNOT BE RAISED FOR 
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. SHOULD THIS COURT 
REACH THE MERITS OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIM, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-6A-3 (SUPP. 1989) IS NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
Lastly, defendant asserts that his conviction for 
operating a pyramid scheme should be reversed because the 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989) is void for 
vagueness. 
A review of the record reveals that defendant did not 
object to the constitutionality of the statute at trial and 
raises the issue for the first time on appeal. Because there was 
not a specific objection raised at trial, defendant has failed to 
preserve this issue for appellate review. The Utah Supreme Court 
has commented: 
'A general rule of appellate review in 
criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record 
before an appellate court will review such a 
claim on appeal.' Importantly the grounds 
for an objection must be specifically and 
distinctly stated. 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) quoting State 
v, Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (1987); State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 
1123 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, this Court may choose not to 
reach the merits of defendant claim. 
Alternatively, should this Court consider the merits of 
defendant's claim, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-3 (Supp. 1989) is not 
void for vagueness as it applies to defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-3, in its entirety, provides: 
(1) A person may not organize, establish, 
promote, or administer any pyramid scheme. 
(2) A criminal conviction under this 
chapter is prima facie evidence of a 
violation of Section 13-11-4, the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
(3) Any violation of this chapter 
constitutes a violation of Section 13-11-4, 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
(4) All civil violations of this chapter 
shall be investigated and prosecuted as 
prescribed by the Utah Consumer Sales 
Practices Act. 
Defendant argues that the reference to the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act without a delineation of the formal 
provisions of § 13-11-4 renders the statute unconstitutionally 
void for vagueness. 
Challenges to statutes on the grounds of vagueness 
essentially involve procedural due process issues, i.e. whether 
the statute adequately provides notice of the proscribed conduct. 
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah 1987). A -statute is 
not unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently explicit to 
inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited," Jd. at 
192, quoting State v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 50 (Utah 1982). In 
accord, State v. Loughton, 747 P.2d 426, 430-31 (Utah 1987) 
citing Lanzetta v. New York, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). Moreover, 
-legislative enactments are accorded a presumption of validity," 
State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987). 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6a-3 is explicit and unambiguous is 
its language: "A person may not organize, establish, promote, or 
administer any pyramid scheme." The definition of a pyramid 
scheme is provided in the preceding section: 
"Pyramid scheme" means any sales device or 
plan under which a person gives consideration 
to another person in exchange for 
compensation or the right to receive 
compensation which is derived primarily from 
the introduction of other persons into the 
sales device or plan rather than from the 
sale of goods, services, or other property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6a-2(4). 
The prohibited criminal conduct in § 76-6a-3 is clear 
and explicit. The additional language describing civil 
consequences of a criminal conviction cannot reasonably be said 
to confuse the ordinary reader of what criminal conduct is 
prohibited. 
Even if the challenged sections were constitutionally 
infirm, any detriment to defendant could only arise in the 
context of a civil proceeding under § 13-11-4. The objected to 
language has no effect on his criminal conviction. State v. 
Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State 
respectfully requests that defendant's convictions be affirmed. 
DATED this f/h day of August, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney G 
i/kied-
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
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APPENDIX A 
SUMMONS 
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STEVEN B. KILLPACK i AS r.r.-ji«T V.* •• 
Utah County Attorney , . . , 
37 East Center, Suite 200 J-j.'.r. U' 0 1 .1 'r' ^ 
Provo, Utah 84601
 r . f . 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH : *' £ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E. O'DELL STANLEY 
DOB: 9-19-24 
Defendant(s) 
r > j 
I N F O R M A T I O N -
Criminal No. %*% ( 
STEVEN B. KILLPACK, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah, accuses the defendant(s) of the following 
crime(s). 
COUNT I: DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, a Class B Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Section 76-6-507, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
in that he, on or about March 10, 1988, in Utah County, Utah, did, 
in the course of business sell, offer or expose for sale adulterated 
or mislabeled commodities. 
COUNT II: DOING BUSINESS WITHOUT A LICENSE, a Class B Misdemeanor, 
in violation of 76-8-410 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
in that he, on or about March 10, 1988, in Utah Countv, Utah, did 
commence or carrv on a business which required a license by a 
county, city or town ordinance without takincr out the license 
required by law. 
COUNT III: PRACTICING MEDICINE WITHOUT A LICENSE, a Third Degree 
Felony, in violation of Sections 58-12-28 (3) (4) and 58-12-30 of the 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that he, on or about 
March 10, 1988, in Utah County, Utah, did engaae in the practice 
of medicine in the State of Utah without first obtaining a license. 
This Information is based on evidence sworn to by F r a n k w < * l i , U C A O 
Authorized foriirosecution by t riz  t riy s c ti  y > 
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Utah County Attorney 
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Provo. Utah 84601 
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DEPARTMENT, EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH 
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E. O'DELL STANLEY 
(•<''('^-. (.<•' f f r ^ ' 7 
AMENDED ' r _ 
I N F O R M A T I O N -
at ^i^ 
Criminal No. 
GO 
/ • 
'/US i/. rr.^C- 7V.V J. 
STEVEN B. KILLPACK, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah, accuses the defendant(s) of the following 
crimes): 
A- ^' 
l 4 
COUNT^f-t^TJ2ECEPTIVE BUSIN^SS._EBAC?^eE^, a Class B Misdemeanor, in 
violation of^S^ti^xi^^^ Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
in that he^j2J*-T5Tabc^^ 19R8, in Utah County, Utah, did, 
in the^ efrcfrse of business sell, oTfe^-or^expose for sale adulterated 
.slabeled commodities. 
COUNT Jff: PYRAMID SCHEME, a Third Deqree Felony, in violation oT 
Section 76-6a-3, Utah Criminal Code, as amended, in that he, on or 
about March 10, 19RR, in Utah County, Utah, did orqanize, establish, 
promote or administer a pyramid scheme in violation of the Prvamid 
Scheme Pet, to-wit: Healthy, Wealthv and Wise. 
COUNT SHE: PRACTICING MEDICINE WITHOUT A LICENSE, a Third Deqree 
Felony, in violation of Sections 58-12-28 (£) {A )(^) and 58-12-30, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that he, on or about March 10, 
1988, in Utah County, Utah, did engage in the practice of medicine 
in the State of Utah without first obtaining a license. 
This Information is based on evidence sworn to by: F r a n k W a l l
 f UCAO 
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